Valuing Toxic Assets: An Analysis of CDO Equity by Francis A. Longstaff & Brett Myers
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
VALUING TOXIC ASSETS:









The authors are grateful for helpful discussions with Navneet Arora, Vineer Bhansali, Mark Garmaise,
Peter Knez, Hanno Lustig, Carolina Marquez, Arvind Rajan, Derek Schaeffer, Alessio Saretto, John
McConnell, and Victor Wong, and for the comments of seminar participants at Barclays Global Investors
and the Journal of Investment Management Conference. All errors are our responsibility. The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Francis A. Longstaff and Brett Myers. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Valuing Toxic Assets: An Analysis of CDO Equity
Francis A. Longstaff and Brett Myers




How does the market value complex structured-credit securities? This issue is central to understanding
the current financial crisis and identifying effective policy measures. We study this issue from a novel
perspective by contrasting the valuation of CDO equity with that of bank stocks. This is possible because
both CDO equity and bank stock represent levered first-loss residual claims on an underlying portfolio
of debt. There are strong similarities in the two types of equity investments. Using an extensive data
set of CDX index tranche prices, we find that the discount rates applied by the market to bank and
CDO equity are very comparable. In addition, a single factor explains more than 64 percent of the
variation in bank and CDO equity returns. Although banks are presumably active credit-portfolio managers,
we find that bank alphas are significantly negative during the sample period and comparable in magnitude
to those of more-passively-managed CDO equity. Both banks and CDO equity display significant
sensitivity to "shadow banking'' factors such as counterparty credit risk, the availability of collateralized
financing for debt securities, and the liquidity of the derivatives market. A key implication is that we
may be able to value "toxic'' assets using readily-available stock market information.
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Much of the innovation in ﬁnancial markets during the past decade has focused
on the creation of structured or synthetic investment vehicles that parallel the
ownership of actual ﬁnancial assets and securities. Examples include collateral-
ized debt obligations (CDOs), collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), structured
investment vehicles (SIVs), and conduits that synthesize highly-rated debt instru-
ments from portfolios of high-yield bonds or subprime loans, collateralized fund
obligations (CFOs) that create leveraged hedge-fund-like structures, and total rate
of return swaps (TRORS) that parallel the ownership of stock without the use of
the balance sheet. This sector of the ﬁnancial markets is sometimes termed the
“shadow-banking” system because these structures are typically complex, opaque,
and largely unregulated.
Structured or securitized credit, in particular, has played a prominent role in
the current crisis in the international ﬁnancial markets. Beginning with the melt-
down in the subprime home-equity asset-backed CDO and SIV markets in late
2007, the crisis quickly spread to other sectors such as commercial mortgage-backed
securities, securitized student loans and credit-card receivables, auto leasing and
ﬁnancing, asset-backed commercial paper, collateralized short-term repo ﬁnancing
by investment dealers and hedge funds, auction-rate securities, and short-term mu-
nicipal ﬁnance markets.
Much of the debate about the role of securitized credit in the current crisis
focuses on the issue of how these structured or synthetic types of securities are
valued in the ﬁnancial markets. For example, many argue that the complexity
and lack of transparency of these instruments allowed them to be issued as highly-
rated investment-grade securities at premium valuations.1 On the other hand, a
key premise behind many of the recent troubled-asset programs implemented by
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve was that these “toxic” securitized-credit in-
vestments were being discounted in the market at illiquid ﬁre-sale prices far below
their intrinsic worth.2 Thus, securitized-credit investments are viewed as having
1From an October 31, 2008 speech by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke, “As subsequent events demonstrated, however, the boom in subprime
mortgage lending was only a part of a much broader credit boom characterized by
an underpricing of risk, excessive leverage, and the creation of complex and opaque
ﬁnancial instruments that proved fragile under stress.”
2From a September 19, 2008 speech by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,
“These troubled loans are now parked, or frozen, on the balance sheets of banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions, preventing them from ﬁnancing productive loans. The
inability to determine their worth has fostered uncertainty about mortgage assets,
1alternated between being overvalued and undervalued by the ﬁnancial markets.
In an eﬀort to shed light on these important issues, this paper studies the
valuation of CDO equity in the ﬁnancial markets. We focus on CDO equity because
of the unique role that it plays in the securitized-credit markets since it represents
the most-junior ﬁrst-loss position in a CDO capital structure. Thus, CDO equity is
the most “toxic” of all CDO tranches, often trading at prices requiring a payment of
$95 or more up front to buy credit protection for a tranche with a notional amount
of $100.
From a research perspective, studying the valuation of CDO equity is interest-
ing for a number of reasons. First, there is a direct parallel between CDO equity
and bank stock. The key insight here is that the balance sheet of a typical CDO
closely resembles that of a commercial bank. Speciﬁcally, the asset side of both bal-
ance sheets consists of a portfolio of loans, while the liability side consists of senior,
regular, and junior debt, along with a residual equity claim which is ﬁrst in line to
absorb credit losses. Thus, comparing the pricing of CDO equity to that of bank
stock can provide insight about how the market values structured credit. Second, by
viewing a CDO structure as a passively-managed “synthetic” bank, it is natural to
contrast CDO equity return performance with that of actively-managed commercial
banks to identify the value that the active management of their credit portfolios
actually adds. Third, since CDO equity is a creation of the shadow-banking system,
we can examine how the unique risks present in this sector, such as counterparty
credit risk and the availability of leveraged ﬁnancing, aﬀect the pricing of derivative
securities.
The empirical analysis is based on an extensive sample of traded tranche prices
on both the CDX investment grade (IG) and high yield (HY) indexes for the ﬁve-
year period from January 2004 to February 2009. We compare the valuation and
returns of CDO equity constructed from these tranches with those for several port-
folios formed from the commercial banks in the Russell 1000 index.
Three important sets of results emerge from this analysis. First, we ﬁnd that
the market tends to value bank stock and CDO equity similarly. In particular, we
estimate the discount rates used by the market in valuing banks’ dividend cash ﬂows
and ﬁnd that they parallel those implicit in the valuation of CDO equity. Bank and
CDO equity returns display very similar properties during the sample period and
appear to be driven by common factors. In fact, a principal components analysis
shows that more than 64 percent of the variation in bank and CDO equity returns
is due to a common ﬁrst factor.
Second, we risk adjust CDO equity and bank stock returns via the Fama-
and even about the ﬁnancial condition of the institutions that own them.”
2French three-factor model and ﬁnd that the two types of equity have similar risk
characteristics. Furthermore, the alphas generated by CDO equity are comparable
in magnitude to those from bank stocks. These results are surprising since, as
discussed above, banks can be viewed as active credit portfolio managers while CDO
structures are essentially passively-managedportfolios. Thus, there is little evidence
that commercial banks were able to add incremental value on a risk-adjusted basis.
In fact, the signiﬁcant negative alpha generated by the largest banks in the sample
is equivalent to their shareholders absorbing a management fee of 157.3 basis points
per year on the banks’ total assets.
Third, complex structured securities may also be subject to additional types
of systemic risk inherent in the shadow banking system such as counterparty credit
risk, shifts in the availability of collateralized ﬁnancing for leveraged positions, and
liquidity/supply shocks in the derivatives market. Accordingly, we examine the
sensitivity of risk-adjusted bank and CDO equity returns to measures of these sys-
tematic factors. The results indicate that both CDO equity and bank equity are
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the shadow-banking factors. These counterparty credit
risk, ﬁnancing availability, and liquidity measures, however, explain a much larger
fraction of the variation in bank returns than they do for CDO equity returns.
These results have a number of important implications. For example, the
similarities in the pricing of bank and CDO equity suggest we may be able to value
a wide variety of illiquid toxic assets using stock valuation information. In addition,
these results provide some surprising new perspectives on the role and valued added
by traditional ﬁnancial institutions relative to the shadow-banking system. Finally,
our results imply that policies targeted toward the recapitalization of the banking
sector via the purchase of troubled assets may have economic costs similar to the
direct injection of equity capital into banks.
This paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on securitized credit.
Recent papers in this area include Duﬃe and Gˆ arleanu (2001), Hull and White
(2004), Giesecke (2004), DeMarzo (2005), Berd, Engle, and Voronov (2007), Long-
staﬀ and Rajan (2008), and Bhansali, Gingrich, and Longstaﬀ (2008) who present
models for valuing CDO tranches. Brennan, Hein, and Poon (2008), Benmelech and
Dlugosz (2008), and Westerﬁeld (2008) consider the relation between credit ratings
and the CDO market. Franke and Krahnen (2005), Krahnen and Wilde (2006),
and Longstaﬀ (2008) consider the eﬀects of risk transfer between securitized-credit
markets and other ﬁnancial institutions and markets. In an important recent paper,
Coval, Jurek, and Staﬀord (2008a) model the prices of senior CDO tranches in
terms of deep out-of-the-money stock index put options and conclude that these
senior tranches are overvalued relative to their economic risks. This paper both
complements Coval, Jurek, and Staﬀord and extends the literature by linking the
valuation of structured-credit equity tranches to the values of commercial bank
3stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
introduction to CDO equity and the securitized-credit market. Section 3 describes
the data. Section 4 estimates the discount rates applied to bank stock and explores
their implications for CDO equity discount rates. Section 5 examines the returns
on bank stock and CDO equity. Section 6 studies the properties of these returns
on a risk-adjusted basis. Section 7 summarizes the results and presents concluding
remarks.
2. CDO EQUITY
In this section, we provide a simple introduction to CDO equity. First, we brieﬂy
describe the securitized-credit market, focusing speciﬁcally on CDO structures and
CDO equity. We then discuss the widely-used CDX indexes and the tranches traded
in the market based on the CDX indexes. Finally, we consider the parallels between
CDO equity and bank stock.
2.1 Collateralized Debt Obligations
One of the most-important types of securitized-credit structures in the ﬁnancial
markets during the past decade has been the collateralized debt or loan obligation.
Until the subprime crisis of 2007, CDO issuance exceeded $100 billion per year.
Assets that have been securitized by CDOs included investment-grade bonds, high-
yield bonds, emerging-market debt, leveraged loans, middle-market loans, trust
preferred securities, credit-card receivables, prime and subprime home equity mort-
gages, asset-backed securities, commercial mortgages, and even previously issued
CDO tranches.3
To illustrate how a CDO works, we will consider a simple example based on a
diversiﬁed portfolio of corporate loans. Imagine that a bank has a portfolio of 100
loans on its balance sheet that it wishes to securitize. Each loan has a face amount
of $1 million, is worth par, and has a ten-year maturity. In addition, each loan is to
a diﬀerent corporate borrower. The total value of the loan portfolio is $100 million.
To sell the portfolio, the bank could sell the entire portfolio to a single buyer as a
whole, or sell the portfolio in tranches as a CDO to multiple buyers.4
3For more details about the structure of the CDO market, see Duﬃe and Gˆ arleanu
(2001), Rajan, McDermott, and Roy (2007), and Coval, Jurek, and Staﬀord (2008b).
4This example parallels Longstaﬀ and Rajan (2008). Also see the illustration of a
subprime home-equity asset-backed CDO structure in Longstaﬀ (2008).
4To sell the portfolio as a CDO, the bank might structure the transaction in the
following way. First, the bank would create an equity tranche with a total notional
amount of, say, ten percent of the total value of the portfolio ($10 million). By
deﬁnition, this tranche absorbs the ﬁrst ten percent of any defaults on the entire
portfolio. Thus, this equity tranche is said to have a thickness of ten percent. In
exchange for bearing this ﬁrst-loss credit risk, the tranche will receive a coupon rate
of, say, 500 basis points above Treasuries. If there are no defaults, the buyer of the
equity tranche earns a high coupon rate for ten years and then receives back his
$10 million notional investment. If, say, four of the ﬁrms default (and assuming
that there is zero recovery in the event of default), the equity tranche absorbs the
$4 million loss to the portfolio and the notional amount of the equity tranche is
reduced to $6 million. Going forward, the equity tranche investor receives the 500
basis point coupon spread as before, only now on the $6 million notional. If six
or more additional ﬁrms default, the equity tranche absorbs additional losses of $6
million, the notional amount of the equity tranche investor’s position is completely
wiped out, and the investor receives neither coupons nor principal going forward.
Because a 10-percent loss in the portfolio translates into a 100-percent loss for the
equity tranche investor, the equity tranche investor is leveraged 10 to 1.
Now imagine that the bank also creates a junior mezzanine tranche with a total
notional amount of ﬁve percent of the total value of the portfolio ($5 million). This
tranche absorbs up to ﬁve percent of the total losses on the entire portfolio after
the equity tranche has absorbed the ﬁrst ten percent of losses. For this reason, this
tranche would be designated the 10−15 percent tranche. In exchange for absorbing
these losses, this tranche may receive a coupon rate of, say, 200 basis points above
Treasuries. If total credit losses are less than ten percent during the ten-year horizon
of the portfolio, then the 10−15 percent investor earns the coupon rate for ten years
and then receives back his $5 million notional investment. If total credit losses are
greater than or equal to 15 percent of the portfolio, the total notional amount for
the 10−15 percent investor is wiped out. The bank follows a similar process in
creating additional mezzanine, senior mezzanine, and even super-senior tranches.
A set of tranches might include the 0−10 percent equity tranche, and 10−15, 15−20,
20−25, 25−30, and 30−100 percent tranches. The initial levels 10, 15, 20, 25, and
30 percent at which losses begin to accrue for the respective tranches are called
attachment points or subordination levels. Note that the total notional valuation of
all the tranches equals the $100 million notional of the original portfolio of corporate
bonds.
In this example, the CDO is based on a portfolio of debt securities. This type
of a CDO is referred to as a cash CDO. To take advantage of the wide availability of
credit derivatives, however, credit markets have recently introduced CDO structures
known as synthetic CDOs. A synthetic CDO is economically similar to a cash
CDO, but rather than there being an actual portfolio of corporate debt on which
5tranches are based, the underlying portfolio is a basket of credit default swap (CDS)
contracts. If there is a default on the underlying reference debt security (which can
be either a bond or a loan) duringthat period, however, then the buyer of protection
is able to put the defaulted bond or loan to the protection seller and receive par
(the full face value of the loan or the bond). Thus, for the purposes of this paper,
the two types of CDOs are economically equivalent.
2.2 CDO Equity Tranches
By absorbing the ﬁrst credit losses on the underlying portfolio, the equity tranche
has a key role in the CDO capital structure as the most-junior or residual claim
on the underlying credit portfolio. Thus, despite being typically viewed as a ﬁxed-
income security, the designation of this tranche as equity is actually a very apt
description in the usual stock-market sense.
Even though the equity tranche in the example above has a thickness of ten
percent, it is important to recognize that equity tranches with diﬀerent thicknesses
can be constructed by combining the equity tranche with tranches that are more
senior in the capital structure. For example, an investor could construct a 0−15
percent equity tranche by buying both the 0−10 percent equity tranche and the
10−15 percent junior mezzanine tranche. This is because the investor would absorb
the ﬁrst 15 percent of credit losses (the ﬁrst 10 percent via the equity tranche, and
the next 5 percent via the junior mezzanine tranche). Similarly, the investor could
construct a 0−20 percent equity tranche by buying the 0−10, 10−15, and 15−20
percent tranches, and so forth.
2.3 The CDX Index and CDX Index Tranches
In this study, we focus on CDO equity with cash ﬂows tied to the most liquid U.S.
corporate credit derivative indexes, the CDX North American Investment Grade
(CDX IG) and High Yield (CDX HY) Indexes. These indexes are managed by
Dow Jones and are based on liquid baskets of CDS contracts for 125 U.S ﬁrms with
investment-grade debt for the CDX IG index, and for 100 U.S. ﬁrms with high-yield
debt for the CDX HY index. The CDX indexes themselves trade like a single-name
CDS contract, with a deﬁned premium based on the equally-weighted basket of its
constituents.
The individual ﬁrms included in the CDX basket are updated and revised
(“rolled”) every six months in March and September, with a few downgraded and
illiquid names being dropped and new ones taking their places. CDX indexes are
numbered sequentially. While there is considerable overlap between successive CDX
indexes, there can occasionally be minor changes across index rolls. For example,
the CDX IG 4 index (beginning in March 2005) includes Ford and General Motors
while the CDX IG 5 index (beginning in September 2005) does not since the debt
6for these ﬁrms dropped below investment grade in May 2005.
Index CDO tranches have also been issued, each tied to a speciﬁc CDX index.
For the CDX IG indexes, the attachment points of these CDO tranches are stan-
dardized at 3, 7, 10, 15, and 30 percent. For the CDX HY indexes, the attachment
points of these CDO tranches are standardized at 10, 15, 25, and 35 percent. From
these tranches, we can construct 0−3, 0−7, 0−10, 0−15, and 0−30 percent CDO
equity tranches for the CDX IG index, and 0−10, 0−15, 0−25, and 0−35 percent
CDO equity tranches for the CDX HY index. We will designate these tranches by
IG3,I G 7,I G 10,I G 15,I G 30,H Y 10,H Y 15,H Y 25,a n dH Y 35.
2.4 Synthetic Bank Equity
At an intuitive level, the parallels between CDO equity and bank stock are easily
understood. Both pay a stream of cash ﬂows over time, but also absorb the ﬁrst
losses on a leveraged credit portfolio. In the case of CDX equity, the underlying
portfolio consists of corporate debt. In the case of bank stock, the underlying
portfolio also includes loans to corporations (but may also include other types of
loans). From an accounting perspective, the balance sheet for a CDO structure is
essentially identical to that of a commercial bank.
This intuition can be made a little more formal by considering a very stylized
bank with total assets of $1 and a book value of equity of L. Imagine that in steady
state, the bank pays a gross dividend of ρL each period. To maintain that level
of dividends, however, the bank must replenish its capital whenever it experiences
credit losses of xt ≤ L. If we view the required injection of capital as a “negative
dividend,” then the bank’s net dividend is simply ρL−xt each period. In the event
that xt >Lat some point in time, however, the book value of equity becomes
negative and the bank is liquidated.
The stream of cash ﬂows from this stylized bank can be replicated by combining
a par Treasury bond with notional amount L with a one-period synthetic equity
tranche of thickness L and spread s on a credit portfolio essentially identical to that
of the bank.5 In particular, this portfolio generates a cash ﬂow of (c+s)L−xt over
time, where c is the par coupon rate on the Treasury bond. A simple arbitrage
argument shows that c + s must equal ρ. This one-period portfolio is continually
rolled over until xt >L . Thus, this simple portfolio of Treasury bonds and CDO
equity can be viewed as creating a “synthetic” type of bank equity.
This stylized example is admittedly very simplistic and is intended only to
5In this stylized one-period example, the premiumleg of the synthetic equity tranche
is assumed to pay a ﬁxed spread on the original notional amount of the tranche at
the end of the period.
7introduce the notion of synthetic bank equity and to illustrate that the parallels
between bank stock and CDO equity are more than purely superﬁcial. In the
Appendix, we present a more-extensive example of a stylized bank in which the
bank’s dividends grow randomly over time, but can be replicated by a dynamically-
managed portfolio of CDO equity and Treasury bonds.
3. THE DATA
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the CDX tranche data used in the study. We
then provide some descriptive statistics for the composition of the CDX IG and HY
indexes. Finally, we describe the three bank return indexes that will be used in the
empirical analysis later in the paper.
3.1 The CDO Data
The CDO data include daily closing values for the 0−3, 3−7, 7−10, 10−15, and
15−30 percent tranches on the ten-year CDX IG index for the period January 2,
2004 to February 20, 2009. As discussed earlier, the underlying basket of 125 ﬁrms
in the index is revised every March and September. Thus, the data are for the
11 individual indexes denoted CDX IG i, i =1 ,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, and 11. In
addition, we have daily closing values for the 0−10, 10−15, 15−25, and 25−35
percent tranches on the ﬁve-year CDX HY index for the period from December 29,
2004 to February20, 2009. These data are for the CDX HY i, i =3 ,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,
and 11 indexes.
The market convention is to quote CDX index equity tranches in terms of points
up front. Speciﬁcally, the CDX IG 0−3 percent and the CDX HY 0−10 and 10−15
percent tranches are quoted in terms of points up front. To illustrate, the price of
the CDX HY 0−10 percent equity tranche was 98.5 points up front on February 20,
2009. This means that a seller of protection on this tranche would be paid 98.5 at
time zero in exchange for bearing the ﬁrst 10 percent of credit losses over the next
ﬁve years (up to a maximum of 100) on a credit portfolio with notional amount
of 1000. Thus, given the time value of money, this price implies not only that the
0−10 percent tranche is expected to be essentially wiped out, but that the losses
will occur in the very near term.
To be consistent throughout, we will express all of the prices of CDO equity
tranches in terms of points up front. For the equity tranches that are not already
quoted in terms of points up front, this requires a simple conversion from the prices
quoted in terms of running spreads on the notional amount.6
6To do this, we assume that ﬁrms default on the basis of the realization of a Poisson
process of intensity λ, and that when a default occurs, the recovery rate is 50
8Table 1 provides summary statistics for the points-up-front prices of the CDO
equity tranches. As shown, the required points up front can be very substantial,
particularly for the thinner equity tranches. The average number of required points
up front is nearly 80 percent of the notional amountfor the IG3 tranche, and declines
to 18.5 percent of the notional amount for the IG30 tranche. The average number of
required points up front is roughly 83 percent of the notional amount for the HY10
HY tranche, and declines to 37 percent of the notional amount for the HY35 tranche.
Interestingly, the volatilities of the tranche prices are not necessarily monotonic with
leverage or the thickness of the tranche. Speciﬁcally, the most volatile IG tranche is
the IG10,a n dt h eH Y 25 and HY35 tranches are about equally volatile. Intuitively,
the reason for this is that the number of points up front required for the thinner
or more-leveraged tranches is so high, that there is much less percentage variation
in their price over time; the credit gamma for the deep in-the-money or deep out-
of-the-money tranches is not as high as for the at-the-money tranches.7 Figure 1
plots the time series of points-up-front prices for the equity tranches. As illustrated,
these prices have increased substantially during the past year as the ﬁnancial crisis
has unfolded.
3.2 The Composition of the CDX Index
To provide some perspective on the CDX indexes, Table 2 reports summary statis-
tics for the composition of the CDX indexes. The ﬁrst part of the table provides
summarystatistics for the CDX IG index; the second part of the table provides sum-
mary statistics for the CDX HY index. For each index, we report the percentage
composition of the index components by industry based on their Fama-French 12-
industry classiﬁcations, the percentage composition by Standard and Poor’s credit
rating (as of the date of formation of each index), and the percentage of each index
that turns over relative to the previous index. Recall that since the CDX indexes
are reconstituted every six months, a ﬁrm that appears in CDX n − 1m a yn o t
appear in CDX n if the ﬁrm defaults, if its credit rating drops below investment
grade, or even if the liquidity of CDS contracts of that ﬁrm declines. For example,
Ford and General Motors both appeared in CDX IG 1 through 3, but were dropped
from CDX IG 4 and later indexes because their debt was downgraded below invest-
ment grade in May of 2005 (see Acharya, Schaefer, and Zhang (2008)). Summary
statistics reported in Table 2 are based on the composition of each CDX index at
the time the respective indexes are constructed.
percent. For each CDO equity tranche and each date in the sample period, we solve
for the value of λ that sets the present value of payments to be received equal to
the present value of payments to be made. Once λ is determined, the price in terms
of points up front is given by a simple calculation.
7See Longstaﬀ and Rajan (2008) for a discussion of the relation between CDO
tranches and options on the realized losses on the underlying credit portfolio.












Figure 1. Points-up-Front Prices for CDX IG and HY Equity
Tranches. The upper panel plots the points-up-front prices (as a fraction
of par) for the IG3,I G 7,I G 10,I G 15,a n dI G 30 equity tranches (in order
from largest to smallest). The lower panel plots the points-up-front prices
(as a fraction of par) for the HY10,H Y 15,H Y 25,a n dH Y 35 equity tranches
(in order from smallest to largest).
As shown, the CDX IG portfolio is broadly diversiﬁed across most major in-
dustries. The ﬁnance industry represents roughly 20 percent of the index, while the
manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and other industries each represent about 10
to 14 percent of the index. Table 2 also shows that while the CDX index consists
of investment grade ﬁrms, the majority of the ﬁrms in the index are rated BBB.
Furthermore, less than ten percent of the 125 ﬁrms in the CDX index are rated
AAA and AA. Table 2 also shows that there is some turnover in the index each
period. Typically, however, there are fewer than six to eight ﬁrms that turn over
each time the index is reconstituted.
The industry composition of the CDX HY portfolio is also broadly diversiﬁed.
The primary diﬀerence is that this index includes fewer ﬁnancial ﬁrms than the
CDX IG index. Since the index is based on average credit ratings across ratings
10agencies, there are actually a number of BBB-rated ﬁrms (as rated by Standard
and Poor’s) in the indexes. In general, however, the majority of ﬁrms in the index
are rated BB by Standard and Poor’s. The CDX HY index also experiences some
turnover each time the index is reconstituted.
3.3 The Bank Equity Data
It is important to acknowledge that it is probably not possible to obtain a sample
of banks with asset portfolios that exactly match the CDX composition of the CDX
portfolio. Our approach, therefore, will be to focus on sets of banks with asset
compositions and loan portfolios that are most likely to approximate the CDX
index portfolios. Given that the ﬁrms in the CDX IG and HY indexes tend to be
among the largest in the ﬁnancial markets, it seems appropriate to focus speciﬁcally
on banks that lend primarily to large ﬁrms.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on the ﬁrms in the Russell 1000 index that are designated
as commercial banks based on their two-digit SIC classiﬁcations as depository in-
stitutions. There are a total of 89 banks that were included in the Russell 1000 at
some point during the sample period. From these banks, we construct three bank
indexes based on the average asset size of the banks while they are in the Russell
1000. The Bank1 index consists of the banks with an average asset size in excess
of $100 billion. The Bank2 index consists of the banks with an average asset size
between $20 billion and $100 billion. The Bank3 index consists of the banks with
an average asset size of less than $20 billion. Table 3 reports summary statistics for
the three bank indexes. The data for this table are obtained from the Bloomberg
system.
4. IMPLIED LOSS RATES
In studying the valuation of CDO equity, our ﬁrst task is to compare the discount
rate applied to CDO equity cash ﬂows with the discount rate applied to bank
dividend streams. This is diﬃcult to do directly, of course, since the two discount
rates are not directly observable. In light of this, our approach will be to solve
for the implied CDO loss rate that would set the two discount rates equal, and
then evaluate how the implied loss rate compares with historical loss rates. This
indirect approach indicates that CDO equity discount rates tend to be very similar
or slightly lower than bank discount rates.
To deﬁne terms, let P be the current or time-zero price of a security, and let
CFt denote its risky cash ﬂow at time t. Standard textbook present-value theory
implies that the price of the security can be represented as the sum of the present





(1 + R)t, (1)
where R is the discount rate, and the expectations are taken with respect to the
actual (not risk-neutral) probability measure.
4.1 Bank Stock
In general, measuring the ex ante expected return or discount rate R of a secu-
rity is diﬃcult because expected cash ﬂows are not readily observable. In special
cases, however, it may be possible to estimate these expected cash ﬂows. One such
situation is when the well-known Gordon Growth model can be applied to stock val-
uation. Speciﬁcally, if the expected dividend to be paid by a share of stock grows









where D is the next dividend for the stock. Rearranging this expression allows us
to represent the discount rate of the stock as R = d + g,w h e r ed is the dividend
yield of the stock.
To keep things simple, we will adopt this approach to estimating the discount
rate for bank stock indexes. As the estimate of the time series of dividend yields
for a bank, we use the dividend yields reported in the Bloomberg system. The
dividend yield is deﬁned by Bloomberg as the most-recently-announced gross div-
idend, annualized based on the dividend frequency, divided by the current market
price for the bank’s stock (the Bloomberg dividend indicated yield). The dividend
growth rate is the estimated long-term dividend per share growth rate as reported
by IBES. In cases where analysts forecasts for dividend growth are not available,
earnings per share forecasts are used. Table 3 reports the average dividend yield
and dividend growth rate for the three indexes. Figure 2 plots the times series of
the average discount rate (taken over all three indexes).
4.2 CDO Equity
Because CDO equity is a ﬁxed income instrument, it is straightforward to calculate
its internal rate of return (IRR) or yield to maturity. It is important to observe,
however, that an IRR is not the same as a discount rate. Intuitively, this is because
the IRR is based on promised cash ﬂows while the discount rate is based on expected
cash ﬂows. Thus, when expected credit losses are greater than zero, the discount
rate will be less than the IRR.







Figure 2. Average Discount Rate for Bank Equity. This graph
plots the average discount rate for the banks in the Russell 1000 index.
Since the synthetic CDX tranches are structured as swaps, their initial value
is zero. Thus, for computing returns and studying their valuation, it will be more
convenient to translate them into their cash (funded) equivalents. To illustrate
how this is done, consider the case where an equity tranche has thickness of L and
maturity T.W ei n v e s tL in a riskless ﬂoating-rate note with the same maturity and
paying coupon rt. In exchange for bearing the ﬁrst L of credit losses, the portfolio
receives pL points up front. Thus, the net investment in the portfolio is (1 − p)L.
As losses of xt are realized over time, they are covered by liquidating the amount
xt of the ﬂoating-rate notes until the notional amount is reduced to zero. As the
notional is reduced, the amount of coupon income from the ﬂoating-rate note is
reduced accordingly. This strategy maps the synthetic CDX equity tranches into
the much more intuitive equivalent of a cash CDO with an initial notional amount
L and price (1 −p)L, and which pays a coupon rate of rt on its remaining notional
balance. We will adopt this simple pricing convention throughout the remainder of
the paper.
If the expected credit losses for CDO equity were observable, then the expected
13cash ﬂows E[ CFt ] would be given by taking the promisedcash ﬂows and subtracting
the expected credit losses. The discount rate could then be determined by solving
for the R in Equation (1) that sets the present value of the expected cash ﬂows equal
to the initial price of the CDO equity tranche. Rather than doing this, however,
our approach will be to solve the inverse problem. Speciﬁcally, we will set R equal
to the value estimated for the bank index, and then invert Equation (1) for the
expected losses for the tranche.
In doing this, we assume that the percentage of losses yt on the underlying
CDX portfolio follows a simple lognormal process
dy= σy d Z , (3)
where the initial value of y is to be determined and where σ =0 .20.8 For a given
initial value of y, we estimate the expected cash ﬂows from the CDO equity tranche
by simulating 10,000 paths of the loss process and then taking the average value of
the loss process over all paths. This simulation approach is necessary since the cash
ﬂows from the synthetic equity portfolio are not linear in the losses of the underlying
portfolio. This follows from the fact that the losses on the tranches can be modeled
in terms of options on the losses of the underlying portfolio.9 From these expected
cash ﬂows, we use Equation (1) to solve for the discount rate associated with the
synthetic portfolio. After discounting the expected cash ﬂows at the bank equity
discount rate, we compare the resulting price for the CDO equity tranche with its
actual price, and then iterate over initial values of y until convergence is achieved.10
This process is repeated for each date during the sample period.
4.3 Estimated Loss Rates
To keep things simple, we will base our results on a single equally-weighted bank
index formed from all of the banks in the three bank indexes described earlier. The
average leverage ratio for the banks in this composite index is 0.0935. Accordingly,
8The value of 0.20 for σ is motivated based on the annual absolute changes in
the default rates for investment grade bonds over the 1920-2007 period (reported in
Moody’s Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2007, February2008.) divided
by the average default rate. We observe that using other values for σ resulted in
very similar estimates of the loss rate.
9See Longstaﬀ and Rajan (2008) for a discussion of the economics of CDO tranches.
10For convenience, we also make the assumption that the riskless bond included in
the funded CDO equity strategy pays the par Treasury coupon rate corresponding
to the horizon of the CDO equity tranche.
14we will solve for the implied loss rates for the IG10 and HY10 tranches since these
are the most comparable in terms of their implicit leverage.
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the estimated loss rates. Figure 3 plots
the time series of estimated loss rates. As shown, the average implied loss rate for
IG equity is only about 2 basis points per year during the sample period. This
number is very similar to the historical realized loss rate for a portfolio of bonds
with similar credit ratings to those included in the CDX IG portfolio. Speciﬁcally,
the historical one-year loss rates on corporate bonds reported by Moody’s for the
1982-2007 period are percent 0.000 for Aaa-, and Aa-rated bonds, 0.012 percent for
A-rated bonds, 0.103 percent for Baa-rated bonds, 0.677 percent for Ba-rated bonds,
2.908 percent for B-rated bonds, and 11.145 percent for Caa- to C-rated bonds.11
Applying these loss ratios to the distribution of CDX IG index credit ratings in
Table 2 implies that an expected one-year loss rate for the portfolio would be on
the order of six basis points per year. Thus, the implied loss ratio is only slightly less
than the historical one-year loss rate; the diﬀerence between the two is insigniﬁcant
once the serial correlation of the implied losses is taken into account.
Similarly, Table 4 shows that the average loss rate for HY equity is about 171
basis points per year during the sample period. Again, applying the historical loss
rates to the distribution of credit ratings for the CDX HY index reported in Table
2 implies an expected one-year loss rate for the portfolio of roughly 170 to 195 basis
points. These two loss rates are statistically and economically indistinguishable.
Taken together, these results imply that the assumption that CDO equity dis-
count rates are equal to bank discount rates leads to implied loss rates that are very
consistent with the historical evidence. These results provide indirect support for
the hypothesis that the market values bank equity in manner similar to CDO equity
with comparable leverage ratios. It is important, however, to raise the caveat that
these results are based on a comparison of implied loss rates to historical one-year
loss rates. In actuality, historical multi-year loss rates tend to be somewhat higher
than historical one-year loss rates. Thus, it probably more accurate to say that the
results suggest that CDO equity discount rates are equal to, or slightly less than,
bank discount rates.
5. CDO EQUITY RETURNS
In this section, we compare the properties of CDO equity returns and contrast them
with those for the three bank indexes. Speciﬁcally, we focus on weekly returns
11These values are from Exhibit 11 of Moody’s Investor Services Corporate Default
and Recovery Rates, 1920-2007, February 2008.
















Figure 3. Implied Loss Rates for CDO Equity. The upper panel
plots the implied loss rate obtained by setting the discount rate for the
IG10 equity tranche equal to the discount rate for the index bank stocks
and solving for the implied discount rate. The lower panel plots the cor-
responding implied loss rate for the HY10 equity tranche.
throughout the analysis, where the returns are based on Wednesday data (Tuesday
when market data for Wednesday is not available). We begin by describing how the
IG and HY equity returns are computed and presenting basic summary statistics.
We then conduct a principal components analysis of the bank and CDO equity
returns.
5.1 Computing CDO Equity Returns
Given the points-up-front price for the CDO equity tranches, computing weekly
returns is straightforward. Let pt be the points-up-front price of a CDO tranche
with thickness L.A tt i m et, we construct a funded CDO equity position by buying
a riskless ﬂoating-rate note with coupon rt and notional amount 1, and receiving
an up-front payment of pt for bearing the ﬁrst credit losses on the underlying credit
portfolio. Thus, the initial cost of the portfolio is (1 − pt). At time t +1 ,t h e
16portfolio is liquidated at current market prices. Speciﬁcally, the cash generated by
liquidation is the sum of rt/52 and (1−pt+1)(1−xt+1/L), where the ﬁrst term is the
accrued interest on the ﬂoating-rate note and the second term is the cash generated
by liquidating the ﬂoating-rate note and credit protection leg (taking into account
the impact of any realized credit losses xt+1 on the CDX index during the return
period).12
5.2 Return Properties
Table 5 reports summary statistics for the weekly returns for the bank stock indexes
and for the IG and HY CDO equity portfolios. As shown, the realized returns for
both bank and CDO equity aresigniﬁcantlynegative for the slightlylonger than ﬁve-
year sample period (four-year sample period for HY equity). The realized returns
are much lower for the large banks in the sample and increase monotonically with
the size of the banks included in the indexes.
In terms of leverage, IG10 and HY10 CDO equity are the most comparable to
the bank indexes. The average returns for these tranches are −32.3 and −16.3 basis
points, respectively. These values essentially bracket the average return of −24.9
basis points for the index of the largest banks. Thus, the returns for leverage-
matched CDO equity appear to be most closely related to those for large banks.
The volatility of CDO equity returns is generally larger than that of the bank
index returns. The volatility of weekly returns for the bank indexes ranges from
about 3.1 to 4.5 percent. In contrast, the volatilities of weekly returns for IG10 and
HY10 are 6.1 and 9.7 percent, respectively. Returns for CDO equity are also less
serially correlated than are bank index returns. This provides some evidence that
the market prices are not merely reﬂecting stale or illiquid prices since these types
of data problems would induce serial correlation into returns.
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix for the bank and CDO equity returns.
Not surprisingly, the three bank indexes are highly correlated with each other.
Interestingly, however, there is a substantial amount of correlation between the
bank indexes and the diﬀerent CDO equity returns. The correlation between the
returns for the Bank1 index and the IG equity tranches ranges from roughly 37
to 45 percent. The correlations between the returns for the Bank1 index and the
HY equity tranches ranges from about 27 to 35 percent. The correlations between
the other bank index returns and the CDO equity returns are slightly lower, but
still relatively high. Again, this suggests that CDO equity returns are most closely
related to the returns on the larger banks included in the ﬁrst bank index.
12There were a number of ﬁrms included in the on-the-run CDX IG and HY indexes
that defaulted during the sample period including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Collins
Aikman, Delphi, Calpine, Tribune, and Smurﬁt Stone.
17Table 6 also shows that the returns on IG CDO equity are very highly correlated
with the returns on HY CDO equity. For example, the correlations between the
returns for the IG10 equity tranche and the returns for the four HY equity tranches
range from about 57 to 67 percent. These relatively large correlations across the
diﬀerent types of equity returns suggests the possibility of signiﬁcant commonality
in the structure of returns. We explore this possibility in the next section.
5.3 Principal Components Analysis
We conduct a standard principal components analysis on the correlation matrix of
weekly bank and CDO equity returns. Table 7 reports the results from this analysis.
The results conﬁrm that there is a high level of commonality in the return
data. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst principal component explains more than 64 percent of
the variation in the correlation matrix, while the ﬁrst three principal components
explain more than 90 percent.
Figure 4 plots the ﬁrst four principal components. As shown, the ﬁrst principal
component represents a nearly uniform eﬀect across all of the return series. Thus,
bank stock and CDO equity appear to be driven by an important common factor.
This provides strong support for the basic premise of the paper that bank stock
and CDO equity have many similarities, despite the fact that equity markets and
ﬁxed-income markets are traditionally viewed as being very diﬀerent in nature.
The second principal component is clearly a bank equity factor since it primarily
aﬀects the three bank indexes. The third principal component appears to be a
contrast between IG and HY equity. The fourth principal component is particularly
interesting since it loads largely on the thinnest or most-leveraged equity tranches.
Thus, this factor appears to be a leverage-related factor.
6. RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
In this section, we compare the returns from bank stock with those from CDO
equity on a risk-adjusted basis. First, using the Fama-French three-factor model to
control for risk, we contrast the alphas and risk exposures of the two types of equity
returns. We then examine the extent to which risk-adjusted excess returns of CDO
equity and bank stock are aﬀected by shadow-banking factors such as counterparty
credit risk, the availability of ﬁnancing for security positions, and the liquidity in
the derivatives market.
6.1 Alphas and Risk Exposure
As described earlier, both bank stocks and CDO equity represent residual claims
to the cash ﬂows of an underlying leveraged portfolio of debt and/or loans. In the
































Figure 4. Principal Components for Bank Stock and CDO Equity
Returns. This plots shows the ﬁrst four principal components of the
correlation matrix of returns on the three bank stock indexes and the nine
IG and HY equity tranches. The upper left panel is the ﬁrst principal
component, the upper right is the second, the lower left is the third, and
the lower right is the fourth.
case of commercial banks, the underlying portfolio can be viewed as an actively-
managed ﬁxed income portfolio. In contrast, the underlying portfolios for the CDX
indexes are essentially static or passively-managed ﬁxed income portfolios. From
this portfolio management perspective, it is then very natural to raise the issue of
whether the active management by banks or the passive management of CDOs are
able to deliver excess returns on a risk-adjusted basis.
To explore this issue, we adopt the standard approach of regressing excess
returns on a vector of market factors and examining the alpha from this regression.
In doing this, we use the standard three Fama-French factors: the excess return on
the market and the SMB and HML factors. Table 8 reports the results from the
regressions.
Table 8 shows that the alphas for the bank stock indexes are all negative. The
19alpha for the largest banks is −32.7 basis points per week and is signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve-percent level. The alpha for the large regional banks is −20.7 basis points per
week and is signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level. The alpha for the smaller regional
banks is −9.6 basis points per week but is not statistically signiﬁcant. To put
these large negative alphas into perspective, it is useful to translate them into the
equivalent of management fees for the underlying ﬁxed income portfolios. Given
the average capital ratios for the bank indexes, these negative alphas are equivalent
to the banks charging an annualized management fee of 159.0, 100.6, and 46.7 basis
points, respectively. Viewed from this perspective, the banks in at least the top two
indexes appear to have functioned as relatively expensive ﬁxed income portfolio
managers during this period.13
The CDO equity alphas are likewise all negative and on the same order of
magnitude as the bank index alphas. None of these alphas, however, are statistically
signiﬁcant. Since the IG10 and HY10 portfolios most closely match the leverage
ratios of the banks, their alphas are particularly relevant. Table 8 shows that the
alphas for these two tranches are −31.0 and −7.1 basis points, respectively. The ﬁrst
is very comparable to the alpha for the Bank1 index; the second is very comparable
to the Bank3 index.
As a robustness check, we also reestimate these regressions using the Fama-
French three-factor model plus the excess returns on the Fama-French real estate
and construction portfolios. The results this regression and the estimates of the
alphas for the bank indexes and CDO equity portfolios are very similar to those
shown in Table 8, and are, therefore, not reported. As a further robustness check,
we estimate the regression for an index of all the bank stocks in the Russell 1000
using monthly excess returns for the January 1984 to November 2004 period prior
to the sample period used in this study. The alpha for this index of bank stocks is
only −13.9 basis points per month with a t-statistic of −0.63. Thus, these results
suggest that the signiﬁcantly negative alphas for the bank indexes reported in Table
8 are not simply due to a misspeciﬁed risk-adjustment model since the Fama-French
three-factor model appears to explain the excess returns on bank stocks relatively
well over the previous 20-year period.
Table 8 shows that the bank indexes tend to have signiﬁcant exposure to the
market and HML factors. The coeﬃcients for the market and HML factors are
all highly signiﬁcant for each of the bank indexes. Consistent with the premise
of this paper that CDO equity parallels bank equity, the regressions indicate that
CDO equity has a similar risk proﬁle to that of the bank indexes. Speciﬁcally, the
13Discussions with several ﬁxed income portfolio managers suggests that manage-
ment fees for an actively-managed portfolio of loans might be on the order of 100
basis points per year or less.
20market betas for the IG equity portfolios range from 1.81 to 0.32 and are all highly
signiﬁcant. The market betas for the HY equity portfolios range from 1.26 to 0.40
and are also all statistically signiﬁcant. The IG and HY equity betas with respect
to the HML factor are all positive and similar in magnitude to those for the bank
indexes, and many of these betas are signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level. The IG
and HY equity betas with respect to the SMB factor are all positive and comparable
in magnitude to those for the bank indexes, although none are signiﬁcant.
In summary, the results suggest that the alphas and risk exposures of the CDO
equity portfolios are very comparable to those for the commercial banks. This lends
support to the notion that valuation information for bank equity may be useful in
valuing synthetic types of investment structures that are often termed “toxic assets”
in the ﬁnancial press.
6.2 Shadow-Banking Factors
We next take the analysis of risk-adjusted returns one step further by exploring the
extent to which banks and CDO equity are aﬀected by additional inﬂuences in the
markets. What additional factors should aﬀect equity returns after risk adjusting for
their exposure to the Fama-French factors? In the case of the bank returns, there
is very little in the way of theoretical guidance as to possible additional factors,
particularly since these factors appear to explain the excess returns of banks over
long horizons.
In contrast, a number of possible economic factors inﬂuencing the returns of
securities or contracts in the shadow-banking sector are suggested by the literature.
First and foremost among these is the risk of counterparty default. Speciﬁcally,
since synthetic CDOs are contracts in which the protection seller has a large con-
tingent liability, the risk that the protection seller cannot perform may aﬀect the
pricing of synthetic bank equity. Examples of papers that consider the valuation
eﬀects of counterparty credit risk include Cooper and Mello (1991), Sorensen and
Bollier (1994), Duﬃe and Huang (1996), Duﬃe (1999), and Jarrow and Yu (2001).
DeMarzo (2005) considers the potential adverse-selection eﬀects on tranche prices
of informational asymmetries between counterparties.
Another major factor which might aﬀect the valuation of synthetic securities
and contracts is the availability of ﬁnancing to leveraged investors such as hedge
funds, SIVs, conduits, etc. Recent papers addressing the role of ﬁnancing availabil-
ity on security values include Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) and Longstaﬀ and
Wang (2008).
A third category of factors potentially aﬀecting the valuation of synthetic se-
curities and contracts is the liquidity of the shadow-banking system. The role that
liquidity plays in determining market values for derivative contracts is considered
21in many recent papers such as Longstaﬀ (2004), Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), and Longstaﬀ (2009).
Based on this literature, three hypotheses about the properties of risk-adjusted
excess returns suggest themselves.
Hypothesis 1. The risk-adjusted returns of CDO equity should be more sensitive
to counterparty credit risk than are the risk-adjusted returns of bank equity.
Hypothesis 2. The risk-adjusted returns of CDO equity should be more sensitive
to the availability of security ﬁnancing than are the risk-adjusted returns of bank
equity.
Hypothesis 3. The risk-adjusted returns of CDO equity should be more sensitive
to the liquidity of derivatives markets than are the risk-adjusted returns of bank
equity.
To examine these hypotheses, we regress the risk-adjusted excess returns, as mea-
sured by the residuals from the Fama-French three-factor model in the regression
reported in Table 8, on a number of explanatory variables proxying for counterparty
credit risk, the availability of security ﬁnancing, and the liquidity of the derivatives
market. These variables are described below.
To capture the potential eﬀects of variation in systemic counterparty credit
risk in the ﬁnancial market, we include three variables in the analysis. First, we
collect data on the average CDS spread for a subset of Wall Street dealers that
make active markets for CDS contracts, but are not explicitly commercial banks
during the sample period.14 Changes in this average spread should reﬂect the vari-
ation in creditworthiness of major counterparties in the CDS markets. The CDS
data are obtained from the Bloomberg system. Second, we include changes in the
VIX index in the analysis since this important index is widely viewed as a key
indicator of the perceived level of systemic risk in the ﬁnancial markets. Also, in-
creases in uncertainty may increase the risk of informational asymmetries among
tranche market participants of the type discussed by DeMarzo (2005). The VIX
data are also obtained from the Bloomberg system. Third, as a measure of market
disruptions and operational distress, we use the aggregate weekly dollar amount of
settlement failures (failures to deliver and failures to receive) by primary dealers in
the Treasury, agency, mortgage, and corporate bond markets. Settlement failures
14We considered several diﬀerent subsets of Wall Street ﬁrms, but converged on
the average CDS spread for Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs as being the most
representative. We note that the CDS spreads of major Wall Street ﬁrms are highly
correlated.
22can occur for a variety of reasons, but are likely to be more pronounced in periods
when there is greater risk of counterparty defaults. This data is obtained from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website.
We include three diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancing availability. First, we include
the weekly change in the outstanding amount of asset-backed commercial paper in
the ﬁnancial markets (both overnight and term commercial paper). Asset-backed
commercialpaper is animportantsourceof debt for manyleveragedstructuresin the
shadow-banking system. These data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board’s
website. Second, we include the diﬀerence between general collateral mortgage
and Treasury overnight repo rates. Changes in this spread reﬂect variation in the
relative ability of market participants to ﬁnance non-Treasury debt securities; when
ﬁnancing is readily available, the two repo rates are close to each other, and vice
versa. These data are obtained from the Bloomberg system. Third, we include the
net volume of overnight repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements (repurchase
− reverse repurchase) entered into by primary dealers which is also reported by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
We use two measures of the liquidity of the leveraged derivatives markets.
First is the total amount of corporate debt transactions by primary dealers in the
ﬁnancial markets. These data are reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Second, we collect data on the total value of dollar-denominated CDOs
issued each week during the sample period. This measure is intended to capture
the potential eﬀects of changes in CDO supply on existing CDO prices. These data
are collected from the Bloomberg system.
Table 9 summarizes the regression results. Focusing ﬁrst on the counterparty
credit risk variables, changes in broker spreads are signiﬁcantly negatively related to
the excess returns for the ﬁrst two bank indexes and for three of the ﬁve IG equity
portfolios. The negative sign of the coeﬃcient indicates that increases in broker
credit risk are associated with negative excess returns. Changes in the VIX are
negatively related to bank and IG equity returns, but are only marginally signiﬁcant
for two of the IG equity portfolios. The FAIL variable is marginally signiﬁcant for
the third bank index but has a positive sign. The FAIL variable is also marginally
signiﬁcant for two of the HY portfolios but with the expected negative sign.
Turning to the ﬁnancing variables, Table 9 shows that changes in the amount
of asset-backed commercial paper is not signiﬁcantly related to any of the excess
returns. In contrast, the repo ﬁnancing spread is highly positive and signiﬁcant for
the three bank indexes, but is not signiﬁcant for any of the CDO equity portfolios.
The net amount of repo ﬁnancing is negative and signiﬁcant for all three bank
indexes, and is positive and signiﬁcant for most of the IG equity portfolios.
Finally, the corporate transaction liquidity proxy is signiﬁcant for nearly all of
23the excess returns. The sign of the coeﬃcient is negative for all of the bank indexes,
and is uniformly positive for all of the CDO equity excess returns. The amount of
CDO issuance is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the excess returns for the two
thickest HY tranches.
In summary, both bank equity and CDO equity appear to be signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by counterparty credit risk. Since the eﬀects do not appear to be stronger
for CDO equity than for bank stocks, Hypothesis 1 does not receive much support
from the empirical results. In contrast, bank equity is very signiﬁcantly related
to two of the ﬁnancing variables, while one of these variables is related to CDO
equity. Thus, the evidence suggests that banks are more aﬀected by ﬁnancing
availability and costs than are the CDO equity portfolios, implying that Hypothesis
2 is not supported by the results. Finally, bank stocks and CDO equity are about
equally aﬀected by the derivative’s market liquidity variables, again implying that
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Taken together, these results indicate that the excess returns for the bank
indexes are at least as sensitive to the shadow-banking factors as are the excess
returns for the CDO equity portfolios. In fact, the adjusted R2sf o rt h er e g r e s s i o n s
conﬁrm this impression. The adjusted R2s for the bank indexes are all in the
range from 12 to 21 percent, while the adjusted R2s for the CDO equity tranches
are generally much lower than 10 percent. These results raise intriguing questions
about whether the actual banking system and the shadow-banking system are all
that diﬀerent from a fundamental economic perspective.
7. CONCLUSION
This issue of how the market values complex, opaque, credit-related securities has
become of fundamental importance in light of their macroeconomic impact in the
current ﬁnancial crisis. This paper studies this issue from a novel perspective by
contrasting bank equity returns with returns on CDO equity tranches.
The results suggest that the market values bank and CDO equity in a similar
manner. In particular, the discount rates applied to bank dividend streams closely
parallel those applied to CDO equity. Furthermore, a principal components anal-
ysis of bank and CDO equity returns indicates that more than 64 percent of their
variation is explained by a common factor. This strong commonality is particularly
striking given that the two securities trade in very diﬀerent markets, CDO equity
in ﬁxed-income markets and bank equity in the stock market.
At a more fundamental level, commercial banks can be viewed as active credit
portfolio managers while CDO structures are typically passive credit portfolios. We
contrast the returns of bank and CDO equity on a risk-adjusted basis. We ﬁnd
24that both banks and CDO equity generated signiﬁcant negative alpha of similar
magnitude over the recent past. Thus, there is no evidence that banks generate
incremental risk-adjusted returns relative to synthetic bank or CDO structures.
Furthermore, the results also suggest that bank stocks are driven by factors
inherent in the shadow-banking system such as swap counterparty credit risk, the
availability of collateralized ﬁnancing for debt securities, and liquidity in the corpo-
rate debt markets. Surprisingly, bank equity appears to be more sensitive to these
types of factors than is CDO equity. These results have many potential implica-
tions for the current debate about the viability of banks and policy initiatives to
recapitalize banks directly or through the purchase of troubled assets.
Finally, our analysis has focused primarily on CDO equity based on corporate
credit portfolios. An interesting issue for future research is how these results would
extend to CDO equity based on other types of underlying debt portfolios such as
mortgage, consumer, or asset-backed loans.
25APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we present another illustration of how CDO equity can be used
to create a portfolio with cash ﬂows that parallel those from bank stock. To make
the intuition as clear as possible, we focus on a particularly simple example of a
stylized bank. Assume that a new commercial bank is formed at time t.T h i sn e w
bank raises both equity and debt capital through stock and by issuing one-period
bonds. To ﬁx notation, let Et denote the amount of equity capital raised. Let L
denote the bank’s capital ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of the book value of the bank’s
equity to the book value of the bank’s assets. We assume that the bank is required
to maintain its capital ratio at L at all times. Given the initial equity capital Et and
the required capital ratio, the initial size of the bank’s assets is simply At = Et/L.
Thus, the bank has total assets of At which are ﬁnanced by LAt of equity and
(1 − L)At of debt. Let c denote the coupon rate on the bank’s debt.
The bank invests its capital by making one-period simple-interest loans to its
clients, where d is the interest rate charged by the bank on its loans. We assume
throughout that the loan portfolio of the bank is similar in all material respects
to the composition of the portfolio of debt underlying the CDX index. The bank
incurs general administrative and business expenses of kAt.
At the end of the period, the loan portfolio comes due and the bank learns
what its credit losses xt+1 are. We assume that any credit losses are borne entirely
by the common stockholders of the bank; that a credit loss of $1 reduces the book
value of the equity by $1 (until the equity is reduced to zero). Thus, the bank’s
shareholders are clearly the residual claimants to the bank’s cash ﬂows and bear
the ﬁrst L percent of credit losses on the loan portfolio.
To operationalize this, we assume that when the bank has credit losses, one of
two possibilities occur. If credit losses are less than the book value of equity Et,
then the bank’s dividends are reduced by the amount of the credit losses. In this
situation, credit losses are analogous to a “negative dividend” which must be paid
back to the bank to restore its equity capital to its previous levels before the bank
can continue operating. On the other hand, if credit losses exceed the book value
of equity, xt >L , then the bank is liquidated and the bank’s bonds default.
Speciﬁcally, let Vt+1 denote the bank’s net income from operations (excluding
credit losses),
Vt+1 =( c − k − (1 − L)d) At ≡ φA t. (A1)
For simplicity, we assume that this amount is positive, although this is not essential.
We will also ignore corporate taxes in this stylized example. Corporate taxes,
26however, could easily be incorporated into this framework. The dividends Dt+1
paid by the bank are assumed to be
Dt+1 = ρV t+1 − xt+1 At It+1, (A2)
where ρ is the fraction of total operating income paid out, and It+1 is an indicator
function that takes value zero if liquidation is (or has previously been) triggered,
and one otherwise. Given this dividend payout policy, the value of the bank’s equity
becomes
Et+1 = Et It+1 +( 1− ρ) Vt+1 It+1. (A3)
Thus, provided that liquidation does not occur, the bank’s equity increases through
the retained earnings.
Going forward, the bank now repeats the process of issuing one-year bonds and
using its capital to make one-year loans. The increase in the bank’s capital likewise
allows the bank’s assets to increase. Holding ﬁxed the capital ratio at L, the bank’s
total assets becomes At+1 = Et+1/L,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,




As before, this implies that the bank has assets of At+1 which are ﬁnanced by equity
of LAt+1 and debt of (1 − L)At+1. At the end of the period, the ﬁrm’s operating
income, dividends, equity capital, and new asset size are given by simply updating
the time subscripts in Equations (A1) through (A4).
This entire process then repeats itself each period ad inﬁnitum unless a liq-
uidation occurs at some point. Speciﬁcally, if at some point in time t + N,t h e
bank’s credit loss percentage xt+N exceeds the capital ratio L, we assume that the
bank ﬁrst pays the interest it owes to the bondholders, but then pays out all of the
current operating income to the shareholders as a ﬁnal dividend. The shareholders
then walk away from the bank, leaving the debtholders to absorb the diﬀerence
between the value of the loan portfolio (1−xt+N)At+N−1 and the notional amount
of the bonds (1 − L)At+N−1 as a loss.
To illustrate the bank’s cash ﬂows more clearly, the top panel of Table A1
summarizes the cash ﬂows resulting from an equity investment in the bank. For
expositional clarity, we assume in Table A1 that the credit loss percentage does
not exceed L until time t + N,w h e r eN>3. As shown, the dividend stream
is proportional to the total asset size of the bank at each period (where we have
27substituted out the the operating income term in Equation (A2) using Equation
(A1)). The bank’s asset size grows over time because of the bank’s retained earnings.
T h eg r o w t hi nt h eb a n k ’ sa s s e t si sg i v e nb yt h er e c u r s i v er e l a t i o ni nE q u a t i o n( A 4 ) .
Although very simple, the bank in this example captures a number of realistic
features. For example, the bank generates a stochastic stream of dividends over
time which is driven by realized credit losses. Thus, this model is consistent with
a single-factor model of bank equity returns in which the primary driving factor is
credit related. In addition, the bank’s dividend is expected to grow over time in
this example, consistent with the usual Gordon growth model intuition.
We now illustrate how the dividend stream generated by the stylized bank
described above can be replicated using CDO tranches and other ﬁxed income in-
struments. To do this, we need to structure the replicating portfolio so that it bears
the ﬁrst L percent of credit losses in the same way as the bank’s equityholders. Let
s be the spread on a one-year synthetic index equity tranche that bears the ﬁrst
L percent of credit losses (has thickness L) on a portfolio of one-year loans equiv-
a l e n tt ot h a to w n e db yt h eb a n k .L e txt denote the credit loss percentage on that
portfolio.
At time t,w ei n v e s tLAt in a one-period riskless par bond with coupon rate
r. We also sell protection on the one-year synthetic equity tranche with thickness
L in the notional amount of At. As with interest rate swaps, there are no initial
cash ﬂows associated with synthetic index tranches. At time t + 1, this portfolio
generates the cash ﬂow,
(1 + r) LA t + sL At − xt+1 At. (A5)
The ﬁrst term in this expression represents the principal and coupons from the
maturing riskless bond. The second term represents the spread earned from the
CDO equity position. The third term represents the credit losses that must be paid
out on the synthetic CDO equity tranche.
To roll the portfolio forward at time t + 1, assuming that the credit losses are
less than the capital ratio L,w en o wi n v e s tLAt+1 in a one-period riskless bond.
From Equations (A1) and (A4), LAt+1 c a na l s ob ee x p r e s s e da s( L+(1−ρ)φ)At.I n
addition, we sell protection on the one-year synthetic equity tranche with thickness
L in the notional amount At+1. Adding the cash ﬂows from rolling over the portfolio
at time t + 1 to the other cash ﬂows in Equation (A5) implies that the total cash
ﬂows generated by the strategy at time t + 1 can be expressed as

(r + s)L − φ + ρφ − xt+1

At. (A6)
28As before, this process can be repeated ad inﬁnitum (assuming that credit losses
do not exceed L) ,e a c ht i m er e s u l t i n gi nt h en e tc a s hﬂ o ws h o w ni nE q u a t i o n( A 6 )
(updated with the appropriate time subscripts).
If at some point t + N realized credit losses exceed L, then the portfolio is
no longer rolled over. In this case the cash ﬂow at time t + N is simply given by
Equation (A5), but with one slight modiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, since the maximum
credit loss that the seller of an equity tranche of thickness L is required to absorb
is LAt+N−1, the cash ﬂow at time t + N becomes,
(1 + r) LA t+N−1 + sL At+N−1 − LA t+N−1, (A7)
which is simply
(r + s)LA t+N−1. (A8)
To illustrate the cash ﬂows generated by this synthetic equity strategy, the lower
panel of Table A1 summarizes the cash ﬂows for the same scenario as for the bank
equity.
Comparing the two panels in Table A1 shows that the two cash ﬂow streams
have a similar structure. In particular, both the bank equity and synthetic bank
equity strategies generate cash ﬂows that are given by an aﬃne function of the
credit loss percentage times the asset size. In fact, the two cash ﬂow streams are
not only similar, they must be equal in order to avoid an arbitrage situation. To
see this, observe from Table A1 that if (r + s)L = φ, the two cash ﬂow streams
are equal. Thus, if the market does not set the spread s of the equity tranche in
aw a ys u c ht h a t( r + s)L = φ, then taking a long position in bank equity and a
short position in the synthetic bank equity is easily shown to costlessly generate a
nonstochastic annuity, implying arbitrage. Thus, (r + s)L must equal φ, implying
that the two strategies have identical cash ﬂows through time.
In summary, we have shown that cash ﬂows from an equity position in a stylized
bank can be replicated by a portfolio including CDO equity. This is the sense in
which we can view the replicating portfolio as being the synthetic analogue of bank
equity. Since this example is intended only as an illustration, we have focused on the
simplest case in which the bank’s loans, the bank’s bonds, and the synthetic CDO
equity included in the replicating portfolio have a one-year horizon. Much more
complex and realistic examples could be constructed in which the bank’s asset and
funding horizons were longer, the bank’s revenues and funding costs were linked to
a ﬂoating rate such as Libor, or additional risk factors were introduced. For most
of these examples, however, a synthetic counterpart could again be constructed
29using CDO equity, futures contracts, interest rate swaps, etc. In summary, the key
takeaway from this Appendix is that even fundamental types of securities such as
bank stock can be approximated by synthetic structures created using securitized
versions of the same portfolio of assets held by the bank.
30Table A1
Cash Flows from the Stylized Bank and from the Replicating Synthetic Bank Equity Strategy. This table shows the cash ﬂow generated
each period from the indicated positions. L denotes the bank’s leverage ratio, At denotes the bank’s assets, and xt denotes the default loss rate on
the underlying credit portfolio. The bank’s operating income is φAt and the bank pays out a fraction ρ of its operating income as dividends. The
term r denotes the riskless one-period interest rate and s denotes the spread on a one-period synthetic CDO equity tranche, where the spread is paid
on the notional amount LAt.
Strategy tt +1 t +2 t +3 ... t+ N
Bank Equity
Buy Stock −LAt
Dividends (ρφ − xt+1)At (ρφ − xt+2)At+1 (ρφ − xt+3)At+2 ... φA t+N−1
Synthetic Bank Equity
Buy Riskless Bonds −LAt −(L +( 1− ρ)φ)At −(L +( 1− ρ)φ)At+1 −(L +( 1− ρ)φ)At+2 ...
Principal and Coupon (1 + r)LAt (1 + r)LAt+1 (1 + r)LAt+2 ... (1 + r)LAt+N−1
Equity Tranche, Notional At 0
Equity Tranche, Notional At+1 0
Equity Tranche, Notional At+2 0
Equity Tranche, Notional At+3 0 ...
. . . ...
Spread from Tranche sLAt sLAt+1 sLAt+2 ... sLA t+N−1
Tranche Credit Losses −xt+1At −xt+2At+1 −xt+3At+2 ... −LAt+N−1
Total Cash Flow −LAt

(r + s)L − φ

(r + s)L − φ

(r + s)L − φ ...
+ρφ − xt+1

At +ρφ − xt+2

At+1 +ρφ − xt+3

At+2 ... (r + s)LAt+N−1REFERENCES
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32Table 1
Summary Statistics for the Ten-Year CDX IG Equity and Five-Year CDX HY Equity Points-Up-Front Prices. This table reports
summary statistics for the points-up-front prices of the indicated CDX equity tranches. Results are reported for the combined on-the-run time series.
The CDX IG sample period is from January 2, 2004 to February 20, 2009. The CDX HY sample period is from December 29, 2004 to February 20,
2009.
Standard Serial
Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum Correlation N
IG3 0.7952 0.0549 0.7060 0.7904 0.9445 0.992 1288
IG7 0.5892 0.0966 0.4546 0.5739 0.9331 0.994 1288
IG10 0.4649 0.1047 0.3363 0.4359 0.8677 0.996 1288
IG15 0.3391 0.0928 0.2329 0.3116 0.7229 0.996 1288
IG30 0.1850 0.0567 0.1205 0.1687 0.4222 0.996 1288
HY10 0.8274 0.0729 0.6188 0.8275 0.9850 0.991 1039
HY15 0.7345 0.1041 0.4825 0.7283 0.9783 0.994 1039
HY25 0.5700 0.1480 0.3206 0.5297 0.9834 0.997 1039
HY35 0.4445 0.1475 0.2353 0.3928 0.9592 0.997 1039Table 2
Summary Statistics for the Composition of the CDX Credit Portfolios. The ﬁrst panel reports the percentage composition of the ﬁrms
in the CDX IG indexes by industry based on their Fama-French 12-industry classiﬁcations, the percentage compositions of the ﬁrms in the CDX IG
indexes by Standard and Poor’s credit rating, and the percentage turnover of ﬁrms in the index when the index is reconstituted at the next roll date.
The second panel reports the same information for the CDX HY indexes.
CDX IG Index 123456789 1 0 1 1
Industry
Consumer Nondurables 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 8.8 9.6 7.2 8.0 9.6 8.8 8.8
Consumer Durables 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.8 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.4
Manufacturing 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.2 12.0 12.8 12.8 12.8 14.4 12.8
Oil, Gas, and Coal 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.6
Chemicals 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.0 4.0 3.2 3.2 2.4
Business Equipment 6.4 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
Telecommunications 9.6 11.2 8.8 8.8 9.6 8.8 9.6 8.8 8.0 8.0 8.0
Utilities 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
Wholesale, Retail 10.4 11.2 13.6 12.8 13.6 14.4 12.8 12.0 13.6 14.4 16.0
Healthcare 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
Finance 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.0 19.2 19.2 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.2 16.8
Other 11.2 11.2 12.0 12.8 14.4 13.6 14.4 12.8 12.8 11.2 13.6
Credit Rating
AAA 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1.6
AA 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.4
A 32.8 33.6 33.6 34.4 34.4 36.0 37.6 39.2 39.2 37.6 39.2
BBB 59.2 58.4 58.4 57.6 58.4 57.6 56.0 54.4 54.4 56.0 56.8
Percentage Turnover 0.0 4.8 8.0 2.4 7.2 4.0 4.8 4.8 6.4 6.4 8.0Table 2 Continued
CDX HY Index 123456789 1 0 1 1
Industry
Consumer Nondurables 9.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Consumer Durables 4.0 3.0 4.0 6.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Manufacturing 14.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 15.0 16.0 16.0 12.0 12.0 10.0 10.0
Oil, Gas, and Coal 5.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Chemicals 5.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Business Equipment 9.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Telecommunications 14.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.0 11.0 12.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 14.0
Utilities 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 10.0 9.0 8.0
Wholesale, Retail 11.0 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 7.0
Healthcare 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Finance 4.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 5.0
Other 16.0 16.0 13.0 11.0 11.0 13.0 13.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0
Credit Rating
BBB 5.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 2.0
BB 59.0 57.0 56.0 55.0 54.0 51.0 48.0 50.0 45.0 40.0 45.0
B 33.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 37.0 41.0 44.0 45.0 49.0 52.0 48.0
CCC 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 5.0
CC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percentage Turnover 0.0 8.0 8.0 6.0 7.0 10.0 5.0 9.0 6.0 4.0 5.0Table 3
Summary Statistics for the Commercial Bank Indexes. This table reports summary statistics for the indicated indexes of commercial banks.
The Bank1 index consists of the banks in the Russell 1000 index with an average asset size in excess of $100 billion. The Bank2 index consists of the
banks in the Russell 1000 index with an average asset size between $20 billion and $100 billion. The Bank3 index consists of the remaining banks
in the Russell 100 index. Averages reported are equally weighted across banks in each index and based on average month-end values for the sample
period. Asset size is in $billions. Market to book is the average ratio of the market value of equity to book value. Leverage ratio is the ratio of the
book value of equity to the book value of assets. Dividend yield is the ratio of the most-recently-announced dividend divided by the current market
price of the stock. Dividend growth is the long-term dividend per share growth rate reported by IBES. Discount rate is the sum of dividend yield and
dividend growth. Credit Rating is the Standard & Poor’s rating as of the end of 2008.
Market Leverage Dividend Dividend Discount Credit
Bank Index Asset Size to Book Ratio Yield Growth Rate Rating
Bank1 530.00 1.21 0.0891 0.0391 0.0928 0.1319 A/A+
Bank2 48.92 1.33 0.0932 0.0355 0.0980 0.1335 BBB+
Bank3 11.62 1.40 0.0952 0.0342 0.0941 0.1283 BBB+Table 4
Summary Statistics for the Implied Credit Losses Embedded in CDO Equity Prices. This table reports summary statistics for percentage
credit losses implied from CDO equity prices. These implied credit losses are identiﬁed by setting the CDO equity discount rate equal to that of the
bank index and iteratively solving for the current loss rate that sets the present value of future cash ﬂows equal to the current CDO equity value.
Results are reported for the combined on-the-run time series.
Standard Serial
Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum Correlation N
IG10 0.0228 0.1973 −0.2274 −0.0228 0.9004 0.991 1228
HY10 1.7080 0.2752 1.0775 1.7293 4.9753 0.954 1039Table 5
Summary Statistics for Weekly Bank Stock and CDO Equity Returns. This table reports summary statistics for weekly returns of the bank
stock indexes and the CDO equity tranches.
Standard Serial
Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum Correlation N
Bank1 −0.00249 0.04486 −0.25229 0.00033 0.22946 −0.143 264
Bank2 −0.00165 0.03343 −0.17862 −0.00062 0.15378 −0.147 264
Bank3 −0.00057 0.03104 −0.16000 0.00063 0.12590 −0.189 264
IG3 −0.00469 0.08829 −0.40256 0.00184 0.30290 −0.025 264
IG7 −0.00489 0.08444 −0.62794 0.00017 0.40800 0.012 264
IG10 −0.00323 0.06122 −0.44963 0.00113 0.31870 0.025 264
IG15 −0.00167 0.03661 −0.25199 0.00087 0.19753 0.026 264
IG30 −0.00030 0.01578 −0.09003 0.00070 0.08164 −0.015 264
HY10 −0.00163 0.09740 −0.32100 0.00402 0.34194 −0.089 213
HY15 −0.00294 0.08257 −0.31195 0.00312 0.25222 −0.002 213
HY25 −0.00804 0.10915 −0.73024 0.00178 0.68518 0.118 213
HY35 −0.00436 0.06131 −0.41720 0.00167 0.34040 0.075 213Table 6
Correlation of Weekly Bank Stock and CDO Equity Returns. This table reports the correlations of weekly returns for the bank indexes and
CDO equity tranches. The number of weekly observations used in computing correlations is 264 (except for correlations with the HY tranches which
are based on 213 weekly observations).
Bank1 Bank2 Bank3 IG3 IG7 IG10 IG15 IG30 HY10 HY15 HY25 HY35
Bank1 1.000
Bank2 0.875 1.000
Bank3 0.825 0.940 1.000
IG3 0.373 0.403 0.364 1.000
IG7 0.454 0.417 0.376 0.792 1.000
IG10 0.442 0.408 0.377 0.744 0.989 1.000
IG15 0.427 0.392 0.373 0.741 0.969 0.989 1.000
IG30 0.439 0.407 0.398 0.769 0.934 0.949 0.977 1.000
HY10 0.327 0.297 0.271 0.570 0.586 0.573 0.592 0.620 1.000
HY15 0.354 0.312 0.281 0.616 0.675 0.666 0.687 0.708 0.949 1.000
HY25 0.267 0.194 0.148 0.416 0.584 0.583 0.614 0.620 0.671 0.765 1.000
HY35 0.268 0.201 0.153 0.435 0.586 0.583 0.618 0.633 0.691 0.790 0.991 1.000Table 7
Principal Components Analysis Results. This table reports summary statistics for the principal
components analysis of the correlation matrix of weekly returns for the bank indexes and the CDO








Fourth 4.70 94.79Table 8
Regression Tests for Risk-Adjusted Excess Returns. This table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics from the following regressions of weekly
excess bank and CDO equity returns on the Fama-French factors.
ERt = α + γ1MKTt + γ2SMBt + γ3HMLt +  t
Coeﬃcient t-Statistic
ER αM K T S M B H M L αM K T S M BH M L Adj. R2 N
Bank1 −0.00327 1.11 −0.44 1.78 −2.12 15.37 −2.87 12.86 0.687 264
Bank2 −0.00207 0.92 0.10 0.93 −1.75 16.82 0.88 8.75 0.672 264
Bank3 −0.00096 0.80 0.42 0.72 −0.81 14.63 3.64 6.84 0.621 264
IG3 −0.00429 1.70 0.39 0.43 −0.90 7.68 0.84 1.01 0.234 264
IG7 −0.00466 1.81 0.17 0.85 −1.07 8.95 0.40 2.19 0.305 264
IG10 −0.00310 1.36 0.11 0.48 −0.99 9.35 0.35 1.69 0.313 264
IG15 −0.00182 0.78 0.15 0.24 −0.96 8.83 0.82 1.42 0.293 264
IG30 −0.00070 0.32 0.08 0.12 −0.85 8.31 0.94 1.56 0.273 264
HY10 −0.00071 1.26 0.54 0.65 −0.11 4.68 0.90 1.22 0.132 213
HY15 −0.00214 1.20 0.48 0.75 −0.41 5.42 0.97 1.70 0.178 213
HY25 −0.00817 0.65 0.76 1.52 −1.12 2.09 1.09 2.45 0.067 213
HY35 −0.00466 0.40 0.45 0.83 −1.15 2.28 1.16 2.40 0.073 213Table 9
Regression of Risk-Adjusted Excess Returns on Counterparty Credit Risk, Financing Availability, and Liquidity Variables. This
table reports the t-statistics from the following regression of weekly risk-adjusted excess returns RAER on the indicated variables. CDS denotes the
change in the index of dealer CDS spreads. VIX denotes the change in the VIX index. FAIL denotes the total value of Treasury, agency, mortgage,
and corporate bonds settlement failures by primary dealers. CP denotes the change in the aggregate amount of asset-backed commercial paper
outstanding. SPRD denotes the spread between the overnight mortgage repo rate and the overnight Treasury repo rate. REPO denotes the diﬀerence
between the aggregate amount of primary dealers’ overnight repurchase agreements and their reverse repurchase agreements. CTRN denotes the
aggregate amount of primary dealers’ corporate transactions. CDO denotes the notional amount of dollar-denominated CDO issuance during the
week.
RAER t = γ0 + γ1CDSt + γ2VIXt + γ3FAILt + γ4CPt + γ5SPRDt + γ6REPO t + γ7CTRNt + γ8CDOt +  t
t-Statistics
RAER γ0 CDS VIX FAIL CP SPRD REPO CTRN CDO Adj. R2 N
Bank1 1.59 −3.54 −0.58 1.30 0.27 4.45 −2.54 −1.63 0.22 0.121 256
Bank2 2.03 −2.44 −0.04 0.91 0.07 6.12 −2.35 −2.38 1.01 0.148 256
Bank3 2.60 −0.20 −1.61 1.81 0.05 7.60 −2.73 −3.21 1.27 0.208 256
IG3 −1.44 −5.76 −0.30 1.18 −0.75 0.64 0.78 1.22 1.03 0.125 256
IG7 −2.62 −2.30 −1.38 −0.41 −0.51 −0.38 2.23 2.52 0.60 0.038 256
IG10 −2.73 −1.21 −1.78 −0.26 −0.44 −0.99 2.37 2.62 0.59 0.030 256
IG15 −2.72 −0.66 −1.78 0.15 −0.16 −1.13 2.34 2.57 0.58 0.023 256
IG30 −2.28 −2.20 −1.54 0.65 0.28 −0.16 1.87 2.05 0.61 0.030 256
HY10 −1.46 −1.33 0.30 0.45 −1.03 0.17 −0.23 1.64 −0.59 −0.005 205
HY15 −1.84 −1.23 0.28 −0.17 −0.75 −0.73 0.16 2.12 −0.90 −0.003 205
HY25 −2.76 −1.18 1.53 −2.03 −0.66 −1.32 0.28 3.55 −2.87 0.075 205
HY35 −2.45 −1.29 1.56 −1.73 −0.70 −1.32 0.18 3.21 −2.76 0.063 205